4.18 Accusation: Combination theory

Published by 1c15 on 3rd December 20193rd December 2019

What if we combine some of the theories we’ve looked at together?

What if:

1. Someone other than the disciples stole the body (Fraud 2)
2. Peter experienced the hallucinated Jesus (A non-personal Hallucination of Jesus)
3. Peter subsequently deluded the disciples into believing that they saw him as well (Delusion theory)
4. Paul had a conversion disorder (Conversion disorder theory)
5. James also experienced a hallucination of Jesus (Another hallucination)

Would this account for all the historical data and be as good explanation, if not better, for the data than a resurrection? There are at least 4 major problems that beset all combination theories

1. Combinations generally lead to higher improbability, not a more probable solution

If a combination theory were to be true, all of its sub-theories must be true. If one is not, then the theory fails to account for all the data. Why does this lead to higher improbability? Flip a coin — you’ve got a 50% chance heads or tails

Flipping 2 coins doesn’t maintain you’ll get heads on both coins. Your chances go down to 25%. If we add three more coins and flip all 5 times in the air, the chances all will come up heads is around 3%. Likewise, 5 theories, each having a probability of 50%, lead to a combined probability of 3%

So 97% chance the things did not happen according to combination theory.

These percentages are subjective, but even if you assigned each 80% in their weight, comes out at 33% and the theory 67% false (0.8 x 0.8 x 0.8 x0.8 x 0.8 = 3.28 or 33%)

2. While combination theories do a better job of accounting for more of the data, many of the problems that are present when considered individually remain when considered together

In our example on say, conversion disorder, this theory for Paul is still highly unlikely and there is no theory James is in the sort of state of mind that would hallucinate.

3. It ends up Ad Hoc 

Even if there were no problems left, 5 component theories must be used in order to account for the data in our ‘theft/multiple psychosis theory. So the theory seems so contrived to make anything fit. For example: the person caught in a lie and then fabricates new lies in an attempt to defend his original lie and then fabricates new lies in an attempt to defend his original lie is acting in an Ad hoc manner. Applied to the resurrection, the ad hoc nature of combination theory creates suspicion that the critic offering it is not interested in knowing what really happened.  Now if there was evidence that Paul experienced conversion disorder and James hallucinated, the Ad Hoc of this theory would be eliminated. But no such evidence exists.

4. Even if no problems remained and there was no ad hoc component present, the mere starting of an opposing theory does nothing to prove that this is what really happened

The burden lies on the shoulders of the one with the opposing theory to demonstrate that this is not only possible but that each component is a probable explanation of the facts. It would not suffice to claim that, if we consider the group of the many opposing theories, the probability of at least one of them being true is greater than that the Resurrection occurred. For one thing, several of these theories are mutually exclusive. One cannot claim that the disciples were hallucinating when they really thought they saw the risen Jesus, and also claim that the disciples were lying in their claim that they had seen the risen Jesus. Nor can one claim that the original disciples were deluded into believing that they saw the risen Jesus, and also claim that the disciples never claimed that the risen Jesus appeared to them and that the account was the result of legendary influences in the years that followed. A number of weak and highly improbable arguments do not add up to one good argument.

Notes on probability

97% — Probabilities here are subjective estimations assigned by the person who is considering the force of the argument, but some may find it helpful to use probability to quantify one’s confidence in the historical truth of a fact or theory. The obvious observation is that in a combination theory each component theory must be true or the conbination is invalid. Therefore, even if one assigned an 80 percent probability to each of the five opposing theories posited in our example (which would be charitable to say the least), the probability that the combination of all of these theories is true would be much less than 80 percent. It would be 80 percent of 80 percent of 80 percent of 80 percent of 80 percent (. 8 x .8 x .8 x .8 x .8 = .328 or 33 percent). If something has a one in three chance of being true, it has a two in three chance of being false (67 percent). This is different than calculating the probability that a theory is true using data that do not all have to be totally accurate for the theory to explain what really occurred. Statisticians speak of a “Probability Via Non-Occurrence” equation for analyzing the probability of theories. This process begins as the researcher decides the level of probability that something occurred. Let’s say you are 65 percent (. 65) certain that the disciples saw something that was not a hallucination, delusion, or some other sort of psychosis. That leaves a 35 percent chance (. 35) that they did suffer from a delusion or psychological phenomena of some sort. Moreover, we assign an 80 percent (. 8) probability that Paul saw something that cannot be explained in terms of natural causes. That makes a 20 percent (. 2) chance that it can be explained naturally. We assign a 50 percent probability (. 5) that James’s experience cannot be interpreted naturally, leaving a 50 percent chance (. 5) that it can be. Second, the researcher uses the numbers of what seems to be the improbability that something occurred in a certain way. Third, the researcher multiplies the numbers indicating improbability—in our example, .35 x .2 x .5 = .035. Fourth, subtract the resulting indication of improbability from total probability or 100 percent (1) In the example, 1 –.035 = .965. This gives us a 96.5 percent chance (based upon our subjective analysis) that the disciples Paul and James experienced a supernatural occurrence. For a fuller explanation, see the article by Gary R. Habermas, “Probability Calculus, Proof and Christian Apologetics” in The Simon Greenleaf Review of Law and Religion 8 (1989): 57–88. Again, the reason this is different than the first procedure is that all of the data need not be true. If someone did not accept the experience of James, the evidence of the disciples and Paul still must be answered (1 –[. 35x. 2] = .93 or 93 percent probability that Jesus’ resurrection is true). Using a more sophisticated method called Bayes’ Theorem, philosopher Richard Swinburne of Oxford University has attempted to demonstrate that the probability of Jesus’ resurrection is 97 percent (Emily Eakin. “So God’s Really in the Details?” in the May 11, 2002 issue of the New York Times. Available to subscribers at www.nytimes.com/2002/05/11/arts/ 11GOD.html [Jan. 6, 2004]). Swinburne’s argument has been published in Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Sources

• The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus – Gary R Habermas, Michael R Licona (Author)